

DAYMUNC XVIII

Security Council

Delegates,

Hello, my name is Cameron Goubeaux and I will be the Director of the Security Council for DAYMUNC XVIII. I would first like to welcome you to DAYMUNC and inform you that I am excited to be on staff once again. It is my hope that this year will be another great educational opportunity where, through your hard work, we will hopefully reach compromise and understanding rather than anger and arguing. I hope you take a look at the background guide to get a start on your research. I understand if some of you are not used to APA citation formatting, but if you are interested in where information came from I suggest using the citation page. Good luck with your research and with your hard work we can have great simulation.

The topics before the Security Council are:

- I. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
- II. Technology Transfer and Conventional Ammunition Surplus Stockpiles

To tell you a little about myself and my dais I would like start by telling you I am a first year graduate student at Ball State University, pursuing a Masters degree in social psychology. After completing my Masters degree at Ball State I plan on getting a Masters in Business Administration with a focus on marketing. I have attended three DAYMUNC conferences, twice as a delegate and once as a rapporteur. I have also attended three National Conferences in New York and one International Conference in Quito, Ecuador.

David Buffington and Melissa Martin will be your dais. David Buffington will be your Chair, and this will be his forth DAYMUNC Conference. He has also attended three National Conferences in New York City and one International Conference in Quito, Ecuador. Along with these conferences, David also competed in the first Global MUN in Geneva, Switzerland. David is currently pursuing a Bachelors Degree in Political Science at Wright State University. He plans to attend Graduate school to study international relations.

Melissa Martin will be your Rapporteur. This will be Melissa's third DAYMUNC and she has also participated in two National Conferences in New York City. Melissa graduated from Cedarville University with a B.A. in Social Studies Education and is currently working on a Masters of Education. She plans to teach junior high and high school social studies, and be involved in educational administration.

Thank you,

Cameron Goubeaux, Director

David Buffington, Chair

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

The responsibility to protect is a difficult idea to define much less enforce. Because the Charter of the United Nations (UN) protects the sovereignty of every Member State it becomes difficult to intervene when necessary. However, the UN does accept the responsibility to protect people from crimes against humanity. As history has shown, these sometimes opposing provisions make it difficult to distinguish atrocities that require intervention from conflict that is within the UN's duty to intervene.

Between April 6 and July 19, 1994, the Hutus killed 800,000 Tutsis, which was a genocide that exceeded the Holocaust in number of people killed over the same amount of time (Barnett, 2003). The United Nations not only failed to actively stop the genocide, but removed 270 peacekeeping forces from the area when the violence started. Claiming that the Rwandan conflict was a civil war, they allowed the massacre of the Tutsi people until early May 1994 when the genocide became too apparent for them to deny. Up until that point many UN Member States had actively called for intervention, but none were willing to supply troops. By dancing around the term genocide, Member States were not required to intervene. It was this genocide that prompted the idea and debate of the responsibility to protect (R2P), and while the UN has said never again, acts of genocide continue to be perpetrated unabated under the guise of a nation's right to sovereignty.

On the opposite side of the debate is the NATO intervention in Kosovo. It was in 1998, that open conflict began between Serbian forces and Kosovar Albanian forces (NATO, 1999). This resulted in the deaths of 1,500 Kosovar Albanians, and the violence displaced more than 400,000 Kosovar Albanians. While the escalation of this humanitarian crisis led to increased concern in the international community, the United Nations Security Council would not create a mandate to intervene in the conflict. However, NATO intervened in 1998 in spite of the lack of support by the United Nations. After several failed attempts at peace negotiations, NATO implemented air strikes until June 9 when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted the ceasefire and began to remove its troops under the Military Technical Agreement.

These two cases create a great contrast in which to frame the debate of the R2P. In the case of the genocide in Rwanda, the lack of intervention led to the deaths of more than 800,000 people (NATO, 1999). This brings up the question of what are acceptable motives for violating Member State's sovereignty in order to protect that Member State's people and stop crimes against humanity. In the case of the Kosovo conflict, it could be argued that NATO's intervention resulted in increased tension between the Serbs and the Kosovar people causing more violence than would have been caused without their intervention. NATO has also been accused of intervening in Kosovo for political and economic gains. This raises concerns about Member States' ability to intervene in a conflict without the presence of bias motivations.

So far, the United Nations has had little consensus on the responsibility to protect. It is only mentioned passively as something that should continue to be explored. While there has been no resolution concerning the definition or implementation of the Right to Protect, the Secretary General released A/64/864 in July 2010; which outlined the necessity to continue to explore the responsibility to protect (United Nations, 2010). The Secretary-General outlined early warning and assessment mechanisms as a major gap in the international community response to crimes against humanity. While the creation of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has instated a line of information to the Security Council, it is necessary to create a system of response to that information as a way to quickly evaluate and react to crises. A major part of evaluating this information is better organization of the information relevant to conflict.

A/64/864 also outlines the necessity for greater information sharing (United Nations, 2010). While the Special Adviser does supply information it is necessary for Member States to share information with the special advisors as well as other Member States. The third gap that this report outlines is creating reliable and impartial assessments on the ground in conflict areas. In order to have the reliable information required to respond to reports of genocide it is necessary to have a reliable information network.

Questions to be considered:

How does your Member State define the responsibility to protect? At what point is it ok for Member States to violate state sovereignty to protect citizens from crimes against humanity? How do we find unbiased troops to intervene in conflict situations? How does your Member State suggest to increase information flow and reliability?

Technology Transfer and Conventional Ammunition Surplus Stockpiles

When discussing technology transfer and conventional ammunition surplus stockpiles, it is necessary to take a multifaceted approach to each of the categories included under the definition of conventional weapons. First, it is important to create greater transparency and security in the trade, transfer, and storage of conventional arms. Second, it is necessary to find, seek out, and recover conventional arms that have been illegally attained, and lastly it is critical to establish an effective program to destroy these weapons to prevent them from being misallocated back into volatile areas. It is also important to evaluate each of these ideas for every category of conventional weapon.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are one of the most commonly discussed conventional weapons threat. The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects has become the foundation through which the international community has built its domestic legislation and formed international agreements in an attempt to combat small arms and light weapons. While the program does provide a foundation for the international community to start from, it doesn't establish specific measures that need to be taken in order to trace and eliminate the illicit trade in SALWs. It has been left to the Member States through domestic legislation, international treaties, and other initiatives to meet these ends.

In the past the UN has implemented programs aimed at conventional ammunitions surpluses with mixed results. After the Conflict in Kosovo had concluded, it was estimated that between 350,000 and 480,000 weapons were in circulation (Anna & Florquin, 2003). The majority of which were held illicitly by civilians. The United Nations attempted a pilot weapons exchange for development program in Albania, but the program was eventually allowed to expire. The collected and destroyed little over 10,000 guns, but was very costly (Rakipi, Abazi, Bumci, & Hide, 2009).

When discussing conventional weapons, the use of landmines continues to be a controversial topic in the international community. Eradicating landmines has become increasingly more difficult with the lack of support by permanent members of the Security Council. Russia, China, and the United States have not signed nor ratified the Ottawa Convention. Without the support of these Member States, the Ottawa Convention does not have the authority needed to eliminate the use of landmines, which is its final goal.

While they are less recognized as conventional weapons, it is important to consider heavier weapons such as missiles and cluster munitions, and delivery systems such as tanks, reconnaissance aircraft, and missile launchers. Even though the threats of these weapons are not as common as SALW, they have the potential to cause larger amounts of damage than smaller weapons. Eradicating stockpiles of outdated equipment is a necessary measure to reduce the likelihood of these weapons illicitly finding their way into conflict. While nuclear weapons are not conventional weapons, recent bilateral negotiations between Russia and the United States have included the discussion of their delivery methods. Eliminating delivery methods is just as important in conventional weapons as it is with nuclear weapons.

Questions to be considered:

What international agreements are your Member State party to, and how are you complying with those responsibilities? What domestic legislation does your Member State have that they believe should be implemented internationally? How does your Member State implement programs to destroy weapons surpluses in Member States who are unable to do so on their own?

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